The doctrine of precedent of the Supreme Court
A formal policy report within the Department of Justice
recommended that the Department should urge the Supreme Court of the United
States to overrule its landmark 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.' The
general tenor of the report called to mind Gulliver's analysis of the doctrine
of precedent. "It is a maxim among [our] lawyers," said Gulliver,
"that whatever has been done before may be legally done again, and
therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made
against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These, under the name
of precedent, they produce as authorities to justify the most iniquitous
opinions, and the judges never fail of directing accordingly."
In what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for a
Justice of the Supreme Court to vote to overrule a major constitutional
decision? This is a timely and, indeed, always important question. It is also a
question whose answer does not necessarily correspond to any particular
political ideology. In some circumstances, liberals may see themselves as
benefiting from a more aggressive tendency to overrule. In other circumstances,
conservatives may see themselves as the beneficiaries. I would like to examine
this question without regard to whether the precedent at issue is Miranda or
Bowers v. Hardwick.
There are two extreme positions. First, the Supreme Court
should never overrule a prior decision. To support this view, one might argue
that prior Justices should be treated in much the same way as the Framers themselves.
The Justices of the Supreme Court may and indeed must interpret the prior
judgments of the Framers, as expressed in the constitutional text, but they may
not explicitly "overrule" those judgments. If the judgments of the
Framers are to be explicitly overruled, it must be through the process of
constitutional amendment.
One might argue that the decisions of prior Justices should
be analogized to the judgments of the framers. Subsequent Justices may and must
interpret such decisions, but they may not explicitly overrule them. If such
decisions are wrong, outdated, or bad policy, they too should be dealt with
through the processes of constitutional amendment.
At the time the Constitution was adopted, there was
considerable disagreement over the amendment process. Thomas Jefferson believed
that the Constitution should be rewritten every generation, on the theory that
without frequent constitution making there would be too little participation in
the affairs of government. As Jefferson put it, "Some men look at
constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them ...too sacred to be
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human....
Let us not weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of
taking care of itself . . ."' James Madison rejected this view. He
believed that Jefferson's vision would produce instability and generate
"violent struggle."
Had Jefferson's view prevailed, a policy of unalterable
precedent would have been quite plausible, for the interpretive decisions of
the Justices would then routinely be open to reversal through the processes of
amendment. In fact, however, the Madisonian view has prevailed. The processes
of constitutional amendment are quite cumbersome. As a consequence, in the
200-year history of the Constitution, only four times has the nation adopted a
constitutional amendment to overrule a Supreme Court decision: the Eleventh
Amendment overruled Chisholm v. Georgia; the Fourteenth Amendment, Dred Scott
v. Sandford'; the Sixteenth Amendment, Pollack v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co;
and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, Oregon v. Mitchell.
In such circumstances, the position that prior judicial
decisions may not be overruled would produce a highly rigidified and inflexible
jurisprudence. There would be little or no opportunity to correct mistakes or
to re-examine prior decisions in light of the changing circumstances of an
evolving society.
Now, it is important to note that these same concerns also
arise with respect to the judgments of the Framers. Because we amend the
Constitution so rarely, the judgments of the Framers entrap and rigidify our
constitutional jurisprudence. As Jefferson warned, we may have come to see our
Constitution as "too sacred to be touched.”
There are at least two factors, however, that may make this
state of affairs acceptable with respect to the judgments of the Framers, even
though it would not be acceptable with respect to the decisions of prior
justices. First, the judgments of the Framers are for the most part expressed
in grand generalities.
They bind, but only in the most general sense. We can and
have developed a lively and dynamic constitutional jurisprudence within the
very broad confines of the Framers’ design. A system of unalterable judicial
precedent, on the other hand, with an ever-growing body of decisions, would
gradually choke off all opportunity for growth and re-examination.
Second, the Framers’ judgments were embodied in the text of
the Constitution through the processes of constitution-making. The Justices of
the Supreme Court may and must interpret those judgments, but no theory of
constitutional interpretation suggests that the Justices are empowered
explicitly to overrule those judgments. Prior Justices, on the other hand, have
no greater constitutional authority than subsequent Justices. Their power to
interpret the Constitution is not superior to the power of their successors
under any interpretive theory. Thus, if subsequent Justices overrule the
judgments of their predecessors, they are not rejecting judgments that have any
greater constitutional status than their own.
This, then, brings me to the second extreme position- every
issue of constitutional law is a question of first impression. Under this view,
prior decisions have persuasive authority only. This poses the question: Why
adopt a policy of precedent at all? Why should subsequent Justices ever have to
follow a decision they believe to be wrong? Since their authority to interpret
the Constitution is equal to that of their predecessors, why should they not be
free to make their own, independent judgments as to the most appropriate
interpretation of the constitutional text?
Several justifications are commonly offered for the
doctrine of precedent.
First, we do not have unlimited judicial resources. If
every issue in every case is a question of first impression, the judicial
system would simply be overwhelmed with endless litigation.
Second, we need a degree of predictability in our affairs.
Interests of fairness, efficiency, and the enhancement of social interaction
require that governments and citizens have a reasonably settled sense of what
they may and may not do.
Third, the doctrine of precedent raises the stakes. The
Justice who knows that each decision governs not only the litigants to the
particular case, but the rights of millions of individuals in the present and
future, will approach the issue with less concern with the merits of the
litigants as individuals and more concern with the merits of the underlying
legal question to be decided.
Fourth, the doctrine of precedent reflects a generally
cautious approach to the resolution of legal issues. It reflects the view that
change poses unknown risks, and that we generally should prefer the risks we
know to those we cannot foresee. It thus values Madisonian stability over
Jeffersonian change.
Fifth, the doctrine of precedent reduces the potential
politicization of the Court. It moderates ideological swings and thus preserves
both the appearance and the reality of the Court as a legal rather than a
purely political institution.
And finally, from
the perspective of the Justices themselves, the doctrine of precedent enhances
the potential of the Justices to make lasting contributions. If a Justice
disregards the judgments of those who preceded him, he invites the very same
treatment from those who succeed him. A Justice who wants to preserve the value
of his own coin must not devalue the coin of his predecessors.
Now, if we reject the two extreme positions-precedent
always controls, and precedent never controls-we are left with the hard
question. When may a Justice appropriately overrule an important constitutional
decision? What is needed is some accommodation between the values of stability
and the necessity for change.
Perhaps the best way to approach the question is by reference
to the reasons for overruling a case. Three reasons are worth considering.
First, in some instances, a Justice may conclude that a prior decision was based
on certain factual premises that have been proven incorrect and that the
Justices who reached the prior decision would themselves have reached a
different result, had they known then what the Court knows now. This would be
the case, for example, if the prior decision was based on erroneous assumptions
either about the state of the world or about the likely consequences of the
decision. Honestly applied, this is the least problematic reason for
overruling.
Second, in some instances, a Justice may conclude that a
prior decision was premised on a state of affairs that has changed so much over
time that the Justices who reached the prior decision would themselves have
reached a different result in light of the changed circumstances. This might be
the case, for example, when there are significant technological, economic,
social, political, institutional, or jurisprudential changes. With such factual
changes, our understanding of the meaning of particular constitutional
provisions may evolve as well. On this view, a decision that was
"right" in one set of circumstances may appropriately be overruled
because it is "wrong" in a new and different era. This is a more
controversial basis for overruling than the first, for there are those who
eschew the idea of an evolving constitutional jurisprudence and who reject the
relevance of changed circumstances. Nonetheless, this basis for overruling,
honestly applied, seems to me perfectly reasonable.
Finally, a Justice may conclude that a prior decision was
simply "wrong" at the time it was decided. Had he been a Justice at
the time of the prior decision, he would have voted the opposite way. Now that
he has found four other Justices who share his view, he will overrule the
"wrong" decision. This is the most problematic basis for overruling.
Without the justification of either inaccurate factual premises or changed
circumstances, the Justice in this situation is merely substituting his
judgment for that of his predecessors. And although his predecessors may have
no claim to greater interpretive authority than their successors, it is
likewise true that the successors have no greater interpretive authority than
their predecessors. Why, then, should the view of the successors prevail? Such
a basis for overruling substitutes power for principle and generates
instability, unpredictability, politicization, and all the other dangers sought
to be avoided by the doctrine of precedent.
Having said this, I must concede that it has long been
recognized, as Justice Frankfurter put it, that "the ultimate touchstone
of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, not what [the Justices have]
said about it." Accordingly, the Justices have consistently maintained
that the doctrine of precedent has less force in the realm of constitutional
interpretation than in other areas of the law.
It is important, however, to understand the rationale
behind this approach. The rationale has been well stated by Edward Levi:
A change of mind from time to time is inevitable when there
is a written constitution ... [for] there can be no authoritative
interpretation of the Constitution.... The Constitution in its general
provisions embodies the conflicting ideals of the community. Who is to say what
these ideals mean in any definite way? Certainly not the framers, for they did
their work when the words were put down. The words are ambiguous.
This ambiguity is no accident. Situations change and
people's desires change. There must be room for the infusion of new ideas. In
this manner, constitutional interpretation is able to "express the ideas
of the community."
Thus, the third basis for overruling-that the Justices are
free to "go back to the Constitution itself"-is at its core merely a
restatement of the second. Except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, a
prior interpretation can be said to be "wrong" not in any definitive
sense, but only in the sense that the process of constitutional interpretation
is a process of evolution. It is a dynamic process through which constitutional
law comes, as in Mr. Levi's words, "to express the ideas of the community."
Those who reject this vision of the Constitution and who insist on a definitive
and static view of constitutional "right" and "wrong,"
ultimately must rely on power, rather than on principle, to effect their
constitutional change.
The real truth is that within the bounds of reason-and I
believe that there are bounds of reason-Miranda v. Arizona is no more definitely
wrong than Bowers v. Hardwick is definitely right.
These decisions are based on widely divergent theories of
constitutional interpretation, but these theories are each held by persons
possessing intellect, thoughtfulness, a commitment to the Constitution, and
good will. We must never stop debating these questions, but we must also not
lose our humility in the process. If we stop, and if we insist definitely on
the ultimate "rightness" of our views, then we surely pose the
greatest threat to our constitutional order.
Bibliography:
Precedent,
the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine. Geoffrey R.
Stone.
Doctrine
of Precedent Law and Legal Definition.
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