The origins of Habeas Corpus
The history of mankind is a series of conflicts, sometimes
sanguinary, sometimes bloodless, between ruling forces and the ruled. Over many
centuries, the people have wrested, one by one, rights and privileges denied to
them by sovereigns and retained control of them so that their liberty and
wellbeing might be augmented.
One of the most precious and most fought over principles of
justice centers around what is called the writ of habeas corpus, the bulwark of
personal liberty. It is the great heritage of Anglo-Saxons everywhere and
through many vicissitudes and setbacks it has survived as a shield for the
oppressed and a barrier to the exercise of tyrannical power.
Many writers, in searching for the origin of this famous
writ, have declared it to be lost in antiquity. That the writ, or some process
similar to it, is of vast age is acknowledged. But, our real and direct
knowledge of it comes to us first from Magna Carta, where the writ is indicated
clearly.
Evidence is not lacking, however, to indicate that the writ
is neither of native British origin nor of Teutonic origin, but that it came
from that fountain-head of modern jurisprudence, the Roman law. It would seem
probable that Rome gave us this process, as it has given us so many other
tenets of law. Roman legions and Roman law conquered most of the then known
world. The legions withdrew when the Barbarians invaded the Empire, but the law
remained, then, as today, the source of rights and duties of the common people.
In the early days of Rome, the Tribunes, magistrates
appointed to protect the plebeians against the oppressions, and injustices of
the ruling patrician class, had great power given to them. This was vitally
necessary, for the patricians, through their control of office, by virtue of
wealth and birth, and through their interpretation of the laws, controlled not
alone the affairs of the city but the lives and destinies of its people. The
Tribunes were sole arbiters of the defendant's fate. They had complete power
over the people. They could summon any citizen before them for trial, or could
discharge the debtor from arrest. Here, perhaps, because of the exigencies of
the situation in which Rome found itself, lies the germ of that idea that
justice shall not be delayed.
In the condensation and codification of Roman court
decisions known as the Pandects or the Digest which was compiled by order of
Justinian, we find a writ so similar to habeas corpus that there can be no
doubt that in Rome lies the true origin. A learned writer I on the subject says
"The writ (of habeas corpus) is somewhat similar to the Praetorian
Interdict of the Roman Civil Law "de honine libero exhibendo," in
which the praetor ordered, when it was made to appear to him that a freeman was
restrained of his liberty contrary to good faith, that he be liberated. Church
I also conservatively states that in the Roman interdict or writ "de
libero homine exhibendo" we may discern the origin of our writ of habeas
corpus.
The Pandects or Digest represents the sum total of Roman
Legal achievement. It contains that which is known as the "Perpetual
Edict" from the fact that these laws or policies of the current consul,
contrary to the established custom, became a permanent part of Roman law.
In the first line of the "Perpetual Edict" we
have the praetor summoning before him the freeman who has been unlawfully
detained, by means of the writ called "de homine libero exhibendo"
(produce the person). The writ was devised so that every freeman unlawfully
detained might be instantly produced before the praetor to inquire into his
detention.
The writ must have been used in England during the four
centuries of Roman occupancy. After the Romans withdrew a period of confusion
and chaos followed but the writ was revived and became an integral part of
English law when order was once more established.
Slavery, of course, prevailed in Rome as it did elsewhere.
A Roman citizen or freeman alone could avail himself of the writ and the
emphasis, therefore, was upon the status of the petitioner and nothing else. In
the course of centuries and when class distinctions had been softened, if not
entirely abolished by Christianity, more and more of the common people could
invoke the protection of the writ.
Six centuries elapsed between the coming of Augustine to
Kent in 596 A. D. and the signing of Magna Carta in 1215. During those years
the words "habeas corpus" were making their way into various writs,
but it was not until many years later that they became a customary means of
investigating imprisonment.
A common writ of the Middle Ages was the capias or warrant
of arrest. Capias was a process on an indictment when the person was in custody
and in cases not otherwise provided for by statute. There were several forms of
this writ, entitled according to the purpose for which they were intended.
Capias ad respondendum was a judicial writ by which actions at law were
frequently commenced and which commanded the sheriff to take the defendant and
keep him safely so that he might have his body before the court on a certain
day to answer the plaintiff. Capias utlagatum lay against a person who had been
outlawed in an action, by which the sheriff was commanded to take him and keep
him in custody until the day of the return and then present him to the court to
be dealt with for his contempt. By virtue of the capias ad satisfaciendum the
sheriff could bring the prisoner to court to satisfy a judgment against him.
Blackstone mentions four writs, which at the beginning of
the 13th century could be used to prevent unlawful imprisonment.
They were writs of mainprize, de odio et atia, de homine
replegiando and habeas corpus. The first writ mentioned early fell into disuse
because of inherent defects.
The writ "de odio et atia:" was invented by Henry
II to remedy abuses caused by the prevailing custom of trial by combat. A newer
method was that of indictment brought by the king upon presentment of a jury.
The former method was notorious for the injustice it caused, since many charges
were prompted by hatred and malice. By the writ "'de odio et atia"
trial by combat could be avoided if the justice found that ill-will or hatred
alone was the basis for charges. This writ is indicated in article 39 of Magna
Carta as not to be denied but it was later abolished by a statute which was
inturn repealed so that, although Sir Edward Coke maintained it was still in
force it also fell into disuse.
Another usual writ of the time was "de homine
replegiando." This cast the responsibility for liberating his prisoner
upon the sheriff or constable. Upon the giving of security for his appearance
in court, the prisoner might, at the discretion of the sheriff, be released but
the sheriff suffered the consequence if the prisoner did not appear at the time
of trial. The sheriff had to keep in custody, however, one who was imprisoned
by the King's especial command or if he had murdered or had violated some
forest law or was in prison for an offense declared by law to be unbailable.
But, as Blackstone says "the writ de homine replegiacndo was guarded with
so many exceptions that it was not an effectual remedy in many instances"
and this writ also fell into disuse.
The writ corpus cum causa was used extensively by the
people as between themselves and the statute of 48 Edw. III, 22 refers to it.
It was issued in the name of the King, and during the reign of Henry VI it was
understood thoroughly by the judges as a writ to investigate the cause of
imprisonment. It does not appear, however, to have been very effective in
liberating a prisoner from custody who had been placed there by the King's
especial command. The royal prerogative was still unchallenged.
Magna Carta marks a milestone in English legal history, not
because of any great administrative or judicial reforms but because it gave in
detail the duties and powers of those living under the Feudal Law.
It did not inaugurate any revolutionary policy nor
promulgate any new theory of the rights of man but merely emphasized and
reaffirmed certain cardinal principles upon which the feudal system has rested.
The Magna Carta, the Great Charter of English liberties,
was the result of an effort on the part of the barons and nobles of the kingdom
to ease some of the burdens imposed on them by King John. During King Richard's
long absence in foreign lands, justice was a farce, the might of the strong
triumphed and no man was safe from violence nor his possessions secure. The law
was administered through graft, corruption and violence by persons whose sole
aim was their own aggrandizement.
When John came to the throne, conditions became even worse,
because one more class had been added to the list of oppressed. This class, the
barons, suffered greatly under John's reign. Many of their ancient rights and
privileges were arbitrarily abolished and new duties imposed. The King
increased and multiplied his rights under the feudal system; he violated terms
of charters granted by his predecessors; he confiscated lands and property.
Arbitrary imprisonment and increased charges such as scutage and castle guard,
due to the King from the noble under the feudal system, were added to the list
of grievances. To this general resentment of the curtailing of their ancient
rights (which was merely a phase of the conflict between royal power and the
nobility in the early age of most European countries) many of the nobles, for
personal reasons, were desirous of limiting his prerogatives.
Some of the nobles looked downward to the commons and
perceived the plight that the collapse of the judicial administration had cast them
into and, hence, while the Charter was primarily intended for the benefit of
the nobles, certain reforms were made which tended to better the lot of the
commons.
The Charter embodied clauses which, it was hoped, would
purge England of the hideous maladministration which covered it like a black
cloud and give to individuals certain rights which not even the King could
deny.
The document was signed by John at Runnymede, near Windsor,
June 15, 1215... In 1299, by Statute 28 Edw. I, Magna Carta was declared to be
observed as the Common Law of the Realm. In spite of this, John and his
successors constantly violated the terms of the Charter, particularly the one
dealing with imprisonment (Ch. 39). But in the years that followed, the Charter
was a standard to which flocked all lovers of liberty. "In Magna Carta we
get the first attempt to the expression in exact legal terms of some of the
leading ideas of constitutional government. It was the first of many like
services which the new common law was to perform. There was no attempt to
destroy the foundations of law and orderly government which the crown had laid.
The period in which the law developed by the crown alone was over; the period
which will share in the establishment of a body which will limit the powers of
the crown and share in the making of laws had begun. Meantime the common law
was safe. The King himself was restrained but the law remained. With the perfecting
of the restraints upon the royal power, it remained supreme."
Certain clauses written down for the first time in Magna
Carta, have survived in some form or another, in almost every modern
constitution and in some cases the exact wording has been used.
"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or outlawed
or exiled... except by legal judgment of his peers."
"Justice shall not be sold, denied or delayed."
"Fines shall be imposed in accordance with the gravity
of the offense but in no case shall they be so heavy as to deprive any man of
his livelihood."
"Nothing shall henceforth be given for a writ of
inquiry touching life or limb but it shall be granted freely and not
denied."
In spite of writs and Charter, almost every sovereign of
England attempted to assert the royal power as not being confined by the law.
John, though compelled to sign the
Charter, ignored it completely and Henry III confirmed the
Charter in 1225, only because of a threat by Parliament to withhold subsidies.
None succeeded in defying the King's arbitrary command of imprisonment until
the case of Hubert De Brugh. This lord had been outlawed illegally by the King
but in 1234, after strenuous efforts, he was successful in having the Royal
Court (King's Bench) declare the command null and void as in violation of Magna
Carta. It was the first breach in the sovereign power.
Originally there were seven different writs of habeas
corpus. The one that has survived to this day is the writ of habeas corpus ad
subiciendum. This is a prerogative writ requiring the body of a person alleged
to be unlawfully restrained to be brought before the judge or court that the
lawfulness of the restraint may be determined. The case is disposed of on the
hearing. The writ is addressed to the one who has custody of the detained
person and he must state the cause and warrant for the detention.
For the next two or three centuries the writ of habeas
corpus became the battleground of the courts. Sometimes the sovereigns were so
strong and the judges so servile that one who was in prison "by command of
the King" remained there. At other times the writ was freely granted by
judges throughout England in spite of the King's displeasure. Slowly, however,
the writ became an instrument of daily use in English legal life, encountering
more and more seldom any setbacks from the royal power.
Darnel's Case in 1627 precipitated a conflict between King
and Parliament. Charles I was unpopular with Parliament and was constantly seeking
to augment his "divine" right at the expense of the people. Charles
had "requested" a "loan" from Darnel and four other
knights. These "benevolences" or forced loans were common whenever
the uing needed money, which was often. Darnel and the others refused to
contribute and they were thrown into prison per special mandatum regis. The
warrant of arrest had been signed by two members of the Privy Council.
Darnel applied to the King's Bench for a writ of habeas
corpus. It was issued but upon the trial, the prisoners were remanded to
prison. The judges held office at the pleasure of the King and in this case
superseded the legal process of law by an arbitrary one of their own. The chief
justice, Sir Nicholas Hyde, upheld the crown on the flimsiest grounds.
Even years later, the judges defended the right of kings,
in the "Ship Money" case brought by John Hampden, asserting that in
times of emergency, the King's prerogative was unlimited and took precedence
over all statutes or charters of England. "If the judgment in the ship
money case was more flagrantly iniquitous, it was not so extensively
destructive as the judgment in the Darnel Case."
Darnet's Case led to the enactment in 1628 of the Petition
of Right by Parliament and which was signed by the King for certain financial
considerations. The Petition of Right prohibited the King from ordering
arbitrary imprisonment and granted the writ of habeas corpus to one so
committed upon his demand to the King's Court or to the Court of Common Pleas.
This reaffirmed the right of habeas corpus and took an important step by
extending the power of granting the writ to the Court of Common Pleas.
In 1679 when the second Charles was on the throne, a
further step was taken by Parliament in solidifying and protecting the rights
gained. This was the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act sometimes called
Shaftesbury's Act, after its proponent, Lord Shaftesbury. It was the outcome of
Jenkes' Case (1676) when Lord Chancellor Nottingham refused to issue the writ
except during legal term when the court sat. The Act provided among other
things, that the writ could be granted at times other than legal term, by the
Lord Chancellor, returnable immediately and he could liberate the prisoner upon
security for his appearance in court. It also provided that persons released on
the writ should not be re-committed for the same offense except by the court
having cognizance of the case. Heavy penalties were imposed upon judges who
delayed the issuance of the writ or wilfully violated the terms of the Habeas
Corpus Act.
All statutes heretofore passed concerning the writ of
habeas corpus had provided for criminal cases only. In 1816 by statute the writ
was extended to cover cases where persons were unlawfully restrained in private
custody. The most important provisions were:
1. The writ of habeas corpus shall be issued...for persons
restrained of liberty by other than criminal or civil process.
2. The judges shall examine into the truth of the facts and
if there is a reasonable doubt as to the legality of the imprisonment, the
person should be released on bail.
3. The writ may be issued to cover all waters, ports,
harbors, etc., on the coast of England. This was to take care of illegal
detention on board ship.
The application of the writ was still limited to Great
Britain, but in 1861 the writ was permitted to run from the English Court
throughout the British Empire except in those colonies and dominions where the
local courts had authority to issue it.
In the cases of Cox v. Haces and Ex parte Art O'Brien ' it
was held that whereas an appeal against refusal of the writ might be taken by
the appellant to the House of Lords, the Crown cannot appeal against the grant
of the writ.
Today the writ of habeas corpus must be granted in any land
under the British flag. It may emanate from any court named by statute and at
any time.
"The writ of habeas corpus is one of the four
important means whereby the power of the sovereign has been limited." To
it in large measure, do Anglo-Saxons throughout the world owe their freedom
from oppression and their reputation as a liberty-loving people.
The American colonies, while still under the rule of
England, always considered the writ as one of their rights, guaranteed to them
by the various charters and statutes as to native-born Englishmen. Although no
colonial charter specifically mentions the writ, all of them granted to the colonists
all the rights and privileges enjoyed by the inhabitants of the British Isles.
Generally, during colonial history, the writ was granted
without question. In some cases, particularly under the governorship of Sir
Edmund Andros, the writ was suspended, but not for long. Under his
administration, "Magna Carta was no protection against abolition of the
right of habeas corpus." But in spite of Andros' vociferous denial
"Do not think the laws of England follow you to the ends of the earth” the
laws of England did operate in the American colonies.
When the writ was denied, public opinion and legal circles
were so aroused that the judges felt the full weight of disapproval. In.
Massachusetts, in 1689, a tax had been levied oppressively and unlawfully. The Reverend
John Wise, an itinerant preacher, refused to pay the tax and denounced it
violently and often. He was arrested and imprisoned and petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus. Judge Dudley refused to issue the writ. Wise sued the judge
in a civil proceeding and won.
In New York, in 1707, Governor Cornbury issued a warrant of
arrest illegally for two ministers of the gospel, Malkemie and Hampton. It was
alleged that they had neglected to procure from the governor licenses to
preach.
Their imprisonment was of short duration, since a writ of
habeas corpus was granted and on its return, they were released.
The New Jersey Assembly, in 1710, by resolution denounced
judges who had refused to issue the writ to one Thomas Gordon.
When the Federal Government was organized its powers,
duties and rights were purely statutory since, unlike the states, it had had no
previous existence. The Constitution of the United States provides that the
writ "shall not be suspended unless... the public safety requires it."
This clause was proposed by Pinckney in the Constitutional Convention and was a
deviation from Morris' original proposal.
It is followed in this by most of the states though in some
states suspension of the writ is absolutely forbidden while in others, the
duration of suspension is limited.
Originally, there was only one method by which a writ could
be issued out of a Federal Court. The Federal Judiciary Act of September, 1789
provided that the writ could be issued only when the prisoner was committed to
prison, under or by color of authority of the United States. The case of Ex
parte Dorr, illustrates the attitude of the Federal Court. Thomas Dorr was
tried in Rhode Island for treason, not against the nation but against the
state. He sought a writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of the United
States. In refusing to grant the writ, the court held "Neither the Supreme
Court nor any other court of the United States can issue a habeas corpus to
bring up a prisoner, who is in custody of a state, for any purpose "
The Federal Courts were loath to inquire into the
administration of the state courts but the famous Nullification Movement in
South Carolina, led by John Calhoun, was the prime reason for a series of acts
passed by Congress which enabled the Federal Courts, in some measure, to
supervise what had formerly been purely state matters. These acts extended the
power of the Federal Courts to issue writs in cases where prisoners were held
in custody by states, in violation of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States. Rev. Stat. 753 provided-"the writ shall not extend to a
prisoner unless he is in custody (of a state) for an act done or committed in
pursuance of a law of the United States... or in custody in violation of the
Constitution, of a law or treaty of the United States." Under this
section, writs were issued in certain cases of "urgency" where the
prisoner was in state custody, and the federal government was involved.
In re Neagle illustrates clearly what the court termed
"cases of urgency" in which the Federal Courts will intervene.
The petitioner was a David Neagle, who had been a deputy
marshal of the United States for the District of California. He was assigned as
a bodyguard to Justice
Field, of the United States Circuit Court, who had received
several intimations that his life was in danger. While in the performance of
his duty, Neagle shot and killed David Terry, who, it was alleged, had
attempted to murder Field. Neagle was arrested for murder on a state warrant.
He petitioned the Federal Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
It was held that Neagle was an officer of the United States
and that he was in custody of a state for an act done in pursuance of an order
of the United States. A writ of habeas corpus was issued and a trial of the
facts held. Neagle was discharged from the custody of the state of California.
"It is thus only in cases of peculiar urgency that the
federal courts will interfere in the first instance by habeas corpus Where a
prisoner is in state custody. But in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
it may issue the writ to inquire into the validity of a detention, under
authority of an inferior court, to determine if jurisdiction and authority are
present."
In Whitten v. Tomlinson the petition and return showed that
the petitioner was detained in custody of the sheriff under commitment after
having been brought from iMassachusetts to Connecticut on the application of
the governor of the latter state. This was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit
Court denying the writ. Mr. Justice Gray, after discussing the various methods
used for bringing proceedings begun in state courts to the federal courts,
continued, "There could be no better illustration than this case affords
of the wisdom, if not the necessity, of the rule... that a prisoner in custody,
under authority of a state, should not, except in a case of peculiar urgency,
be discharged by a court or judge of the United States, upon a writ of habeas
corpus, in advance of a proceeding in the courts of the state to test the
validity of his arrest and detention. To adopt a different rule would unduly
interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction of the states and with the
performance by this court of its appropriate duties."
In Ireland v. Woods the petitioner was arrested in New York
and at the request of the Governor of New Jersey, extradited to that state. In
refusing to grant a writ of habeas corpus, the court said, "The validity
of a statute is not drawn into question every time rights claimed under such
statute are controverted nor is the validity of an authority every time an act
done by such authority is disputed."
The Federal Constitution does not provide a method for
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. At the beginning of the Civil War, President
Lincoln, by proclamation, suspended the writ. At once, the question arose: In
what branch of the government, executive or legislative, is vested the power to
suspend the writ. Great controversy arose not only in legal circles but among
laymen. Argument waxed furiously and a veritable hail of pamphlets and
articles, some attacking the President's act as a usurpation of power, others
upholding his right, flooded the nation. The authors did not, apparently,
consider the question settled, academically, at least, even after Chief Justice
Taney, in 1861, in Ex parte Merryma, held that Congress alone possessed the
power of suspending the operation of the writ. Other opinions upheld this view
though there were dissenting opinions.
Practically, the situation was settled by Congress which on
March 3, 1863, authorized the President to suspend the writ, when in his
opinion, the state of the country demanded it. It was held, however, that
during the suspension, persons who had a claim for unlawful imprisonment still
had their common law right for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.
In Ex parte Milligan, a case arising out of the suspension
of the writ, it was held that suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course
and on its return, the court decides whether the applicant is denied the right
of proceeding further.
Lambdin Milligan was arrested by the military authorities
of the department of Indiana on a charge of aiding and abetting the Confederate
forces. He contended that since Indiana was not within the military zone of
operations, he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus and a trial by the civil
authorities. Eminent counsel were on both sides of the argument. Milligan lost
his motion.
"A distinction has been made, however, between the
suspension of the privilege of the writ in a constitutional sense and the right
of a military commander to refuse obedience to such a writ when justified by
the exigencies of war or the ipso facto suspension which takes place whenever
martial law exists and it has been held entirely competent for the officer in
command to suspend or discharge writs when necessary."
In some states the writ is considered of such great
importance and protection against unlawful and unjust power that the suspension
of the writ is forbidden by their constitutions while in other states, the time
during which it may be suspended is limited, usually, to three or six months.
Originally, this had also been the intention of the framers
of the Federal Constitution.
Massachusetts is the only state that ever suspended the
operation of the writ. This occurred during the early years of its statehood
from November, 1786, to July, 1787, when the so-called Shay's Rebellion
threatened to overthrow the Commonwealth.
During the War of the Rebellion, the entire Confederacy was
involved when the Confederate Government suspended the writ for the duration of
the War.
New York follows closely the Federal Government in its
Constitution in its provision regarding the writ of habeas corpus. When the Civil
Practice Act was adopted, succeeding the Code of Civil Procedure, it prescribed
rules and regulations for the issuance of the writ. It is interesting to note
that the Attorney-General or District Attorney may, unlike in England, appeal
from a final order discharging the prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus. Section
1274 allows the prisoner to appeal from an order denying release.
The principal inquiry of the writ is as to the jurisdiction
or power of the person or tribunal to detain the individual imprisoned or restrained.
If the power exists and the magistrate has authority to pronounce the judgment
for the cause assigned, the statute forbids review of his decision by this
writ; if not, the prisoner is discharged. No errors of law or judgment will be
inquired into and corrected.
Persons accused of violating the Prohibition Law have found
an ally in the writ. It was held, in Matter of Horschler, that the writ will
lie to discharge the prisoner after conviction, on a charge of possessing
liquor where the only evidence was that of a police officer who entered
relator's house without a warrant and found liquor therein.
Except in rare cases where the facts before the court
cannot be materially changed, qualified or explained, important issues should
not be determined in a habeas corpus proceeding.
The writ of habeas corpus, throughout the centuries, has
grown but slowly. It overcame the tremendous forces bent upon its extinction
and extended itself, with altered political and social conditions, to rest like
a protecting hand, over our entire legal fabric. When injustice can no longer
harm, then habeas corpus will have outlived its usefulness. Until then, it is a
mighty shield.
Bibliography:
Historical
Aspects of Habeas Corpus. Albert S. Glass. St. John's Law Review. Volume 9 Issue 1 Volume 9, December 1934, Number 1
Habeas
Corpus Writ of Liberty, Boumediene and Beyond Scott J. Shackelford. Cleveland
State University.
Magna
Carta: Muse and Mentor. Writ of Habeas Corpus. Library of Congress
Habeas
Corpus the most extraordinary writ. Joseph Dale Robertson
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