The Treaty of Rome

 On 25th March 1957, two treaties were signed in Rome that gave birth to the European Economic Community (EEC) and to European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom): the Treaties of Rome. The signatories of the historic agreement were Christian Pineau on behalf of France, Joseph Luns from the Netherlands, Paul Henri Spaak from Belgium, Joseph Bech  from Luxemburg, Antonio Segni from Italy and Konrad Adenauer from the Federal Republic of Germany. The Treaties were ratified by National Parliaments over the following months and came into force on 1st January 1958.

Understandings of the history of European integration have been shaped by an evocative phrase included in the Treaty of Rome: that the goal of the process was ‘ever closer union’. Political scientists devised the ‘neo-functionalist’ model to explain the ‘spill-over effect’ of the process: the integration of the coal and steel industries of the founding members in the early 1950s ‘spilled over’ to closer economic integration, leading inevitably to the creation of the common market with the Treaty of Rome.  This economic integration, following this theory, would similarly ‘spill over’ into other areas, resulting in political union (with the creation of the European Union in 1992) and monetary integration (with the creation of the single currency). ‘Ever closer union’ is thus seen as both inevitable and desirable. The well-worn cliché of European officials in Brussels likening the European project to a bicycle that must perpetually move forward – or topple – reflects this understanding of the integration process. Moreover, this teleological reading of the history of European integration promotes uncritical calls for ‘federal leaps’ towards more Europe to deal with current challenges.

In practice, the first European institution, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was the result of a French initiative aimed at pooling the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, and open to other European countries. While the idea for the ECSC came from Jean Monnet, the energetic head of economic planning in France, the reasons behind the initiative have been debated among historians for decades. Proponents of the neo-functionalist model have argued that the far-sighted Monnet (first and foremost among the ‘founding fathers’) understood that sectoral integration would ‘spill over’ into broader economic and political integration, culminating in a genuine European federation. More critical studies have explained how the plan met French national interests; by integrating the French and German economies, the economic recovery of West Germany presented less of a threat to France, which had been invaded by German troops on three occasions since 1870. The choice of whether to join the ECSC was similarly made by each national government based on their perceived interests; it was on these grounds that the British government opted to decline to become a founding member of the first European institutions.

The Treaty of Rome, signed five years after the ECSC became operational, emanated from a series of proposals, far from predetermined, that sought to address particular national interests and priorities. On economic integration, the Dutch, whose economy was heavily dependent on exports (especially to the booming Western German market) were pushing to make permanent the liberalisation which had already been underway through the Marshall Plan-inspired Organisation for European Economic Cooperation and thereby avoid a repeat of the protectionist interwar years. On the other side, the French were more interested in the integration of transport and atomic energy. The success of the Treaty of Rome lay in a formula devised by the Belgian negotiator Paul-Henri Spaak to establish a link between the proposed Customs Union and EURATOM (the European Atomic Energy Community). The Suez crisis and the subsequent French humiliation offered a final push and, as the West Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer suggested to the French, ‘Europe will be your revenge’. Far from being an inevitable ‘spill over’ preordained by the creation of the ECSC earlier that decade, the Treaty of Rome was instead a successful example of accommodating distinct national interests in the form of a supranational project. Indeed, to the political leaders of the six founding member states, European integration promised three highly desired outcomes: peace, prosperity, and power.

Economic integration, and particularly the creation through the Treaty of Rome of the Common Market, contributed immeasurably to the development of close relations among countries in Western Europe who had fought bitterly in two devastating wars in the first half of the century. For the former Axis powers, (West) Germany and Italy, membership of the European Community restored their standing as respectable members of the international community. For France and the Benelux countries, integration allowed them to benefit from and, in a limited sense, control the economic resurgence of Germany. While not all national leaders were committed to the ultimate goal of a European federation, steps in that direction were endorsed by leaders who had suffered during the Second World War and who understood the tragic consequences of competing nationalisms, and this reflected the desire of their electorates to avoid yet another European war.

While the economic recoveries of the member states had been underway well before 1957, the elimination of trade barriers among these increasingly wealthy and productive countries fostered a sustained period of economic growth unique in the history of contemporary Europe. As a means of shoring up an integrated Western Europe as a political power in its own right, on the other hand, the Treaty of Rome had only limited success.  Peace and prosperity allowed the European Community and then the European Union to emerge as an important voice on issues related to trade and the economy. Yet initial hopes that a united Europe could emerge as a ‘third power’ to counter the weight of the United States and the Soviet Union never came to fruition. Many French leaders expected the additional five members to simply amplify France’s voice, but divisions among the Six over international issues undermined this strategy. Attempts at forging a common foreign policy for the European Community and, later, the European Union have been disappointing at best. More recent innovations such as the creation of a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the development of the EU’s own diplomatic corps, key innovations of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, have done little to alter this.

One goal that was strikingly absent from the Treaty of Rome and other early initiatives aimed at European integration was democracy. As historian Antonin Cohen has shown, the first plans that Jean Monnet drew up for the ECSC failed to include any mention of an assembly – the European Assembly would be added later and its successor, the European Parliament, only had directly elected MEPs from 1979. This omission was not as odd as it may seem; Monnet originally modelled the ECSC on his French planning office, which was accountable directly to the Prime Minister and thereby bypassed both the Cabinet and the French parliament. Popular support (if not democratic legitimacy) for European institutions came not from the direct election of relatively powerless deputies, but rather by the EC’s success in delivering economic prosperity and improving the situation of national citizens. While not ordained through the ballot box, a ‘permissive consensus’ allowed national governments to proceed with European integration on the grounds that it provided rising living standards and ensured the absence of war.

In the 1970s, when stagflation dominated the industrialised West, the European Community redefined itself as an exporter of democracy. Democracy as the new binding principle of European integration was a gradual, almost accidental discovery driven by the political transitions in Greece, Spain and Portugal. With the end of the Cold War, the European Union reinterpreted its mission once again to spread democracy eastwards, now re-embracing the ‘kidnapped Occident’ at the heart of the continent. The example of democracy – absent from the earliest stages of integration yet later seized upon as a core mission of the EU – demonstrates the EU’s capacity to redefine itself. As the spreading of democracy through enlargement has effectively come to an end, the European Union must again redefine its mission to develop a renewed sense of purpose and to regain popular support among its citizens.

The drafting of the Treaty of Rome and the subsequent development of the EC took place in a very particular geopolitical context, namely the Cold War. Having seen Western Europe tear itself apart twice in the first half of the twentieth century, the United States actively encouraged some form of integration among the countries of Western Europe. Indeed, every American president from Truman to Obama also encouraged the United Kingdom to play a central role in European integration to further strengthen the community. With American military protection in the form of NATO (from 1949) and economic support through the Marshall Plan (from 1947), Europe benefitted from a unique environment conducive to integration.

While one superpower encouraged European cooperation through political, military, and financial support, the other spurred European cooperation through fear. By 1950, Communist regimes had been set up in European capitals all the way to East Berlin and Prague, and the outbreak of the Korean War that June – just one month after France had proposed the creation of the ECSC – prompted some leaders to fear that the next Communist offensive would be launched against Western Europe. The presence of a seemingly antagonistic power on its doorstep gave further impetus to Western Europe to unite.

The Historical Roots of United Europe

Towards the European Economic Community. 1943-1957

After World War II the idea of a united Europe was transformed into a more concrete reality. Jean Monnet’s idea to use economic integration as an instrument for political reconciliation formed the basis of the decision taken by Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, The Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg to create, in 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The concept behind this project was not purely economic but also political and symbolic. It paved the way for Franco-German reconciliation, assuming a new system of relations between the European states. Calls for a united Europe were also coming from intellectuals and social groups.

Particularly active were the federalist movements, supporters of an authentic European federation, of which Altiero Spinelli was one of the principal inspirational figures.

The first attempt to extend European integration, through the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC), which included Alcide De Gasperi’s project for a European Political Community, caused a moment of crisis but also of opportunity. The failure of the EDC (1954) was followed by a re-launch of the European integration project. The meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member countries of the ECSC at Messina in June 1955, organised by Paul-Henri Spaak, led to the initiation of talks culminating in the signing of the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957 which created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).

From Rome to Maastricht. 1957-1992

On 1 January 1958 the official activities of the EEC and EURATOM and their principal institutions: the Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Court of Justice got underway.

The first decade of European integration saw a strong growth of the Community’s market and institutions with the launching of the Common Agricultural Policy and the completion of the Customs Union, in 1968. Simultaneously, within the framework of EURATOM, the first cooperation projects were initiated in the field of nuclear research. The EEC confirmed its role in the domain of international trade and, through the Yaoundé Convention (1963), laid the groundwork for the introduction of a Community policy for development cooperation. On the political level the 1960’s were characterised by the French veto of Britain’s application to join the EEC and by differences of opinion between the intergovernmental visions promoted by Paris and the supranational vocation of the European Commission.

The economic success of the Community and the radical social and political changes of the late 1960’s encouraged the leaders of the Six to meet at The Hague in December 1969, to open discussions on enlargement and the rolling-out of new policies in the monetary, social, environmental and regional spheres. The European Parliament reinforced its democratic legitimacy by means of its first direct election in 1979. The completion of the Single Market and the re-launching of the concept of monetary integration were the main accomplishments of the EEC during the 1980’s. The realisation of the Single European Act in 1986 served as the basis for a more integrated Europe, both politically and economically. It opened the way for the creation of the European Union, which took place in the post-Cold War era, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht on 1 November 1993.

The European Union after Maastricht. 1992-2017

The Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union were the main actions completed by the EU in the decade following the signature of the Maastricht Treaty.

After Maastricht, the European integration process was characterised by successive waves of enlargement that, from 1995 to the present, increased the number of member countries from 12 to 28. This process reinforced the unification of the European continent after the political and ideological divisions of the Cold War and its aftermath.

The evolution of the EU after 1992 required a new set of reforms to the founding treaties, designed to improve the functioning of the institutions and the decisional process. The Treaty of Maastricht was thereby reformed by the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001), which were subsequently followed by the proposal for a treaty establishing a Constitution of Europe (2004). While this treaty was never ratified as a result of its rejection in referendums held in France and The Netherlands in 2005, it formed the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon (2007). Amongst the principal innovations introduced by this Treaty, which came into effect on the 1 December 2009, were the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament, a deeper cooperation in the field of foreign relations and common security and extended Community competences on external border controls, immigration, judicial and police cooperation.

Bibliography: 

Rome treaties.

Alas, poor Europe. Eirini Karamouzi, Luc-André Brunet.

The ‘Treaties’ of Rome (1957).

The history of European Union