The origin of the right to defense counsel in the criminal procedure system


Introduction 

Guaranteeing human rights in general and the legitimate rights and interests of the accused in criminal proceedings in particular has always been considered a key task of the law and of the state’s institutions. In other words, guaranteeing such procedural rights is an important part of the overall guarantee of people’s rights. A society is generally considered a civilized and progressive one when every citizen is legally protected by a fair and democratically-run legislative system. As for persons accused of criminal activity in particular, despite their responsibility for the legal consequences of their violations of the law, their legitimate rights and interests must still be guaranteed. One of the rights of the accused that the state must guarantee is the right to defense counsel.
The constitutions and laws of most nations have indeed recognized the right to defense counsel as a basic procedural right of the accused and the state is responsible for guaranteeing its availability. At the international level, the right to defense counsel has also been recognized in most international legal instruments on human rights. The details of the relevant legal instruments all show that the guarantee of the right to defense counsel is an important aspect of the guarantee of the right to a fair trial. 

However, criminal procedure is not necessarily an equal struggle between the opposing parties. This means that, for fairness to prevail, all parties in the proceedings - including the prosecution and the defense - must each be vested with the opportunity to perform their functions. On this basis, the accused must be supported by defense counsels - who are qualified in terms of legal knowledge and capable of participating in proceedings in a manner which is also fair to the prosecution. Guaranteeing the right to defense counsel involves ensuring that the accused is supported by defense counsel and guaranteeing the requisite conditions for defense counsel so that they can protect their client against the allegations of the state.

Currently, the tasks of guaranteeing human rights and improving the law of criminal procedure have attracted the attention of many nations. However, one of the difficulties that such nations face in the process is that of assuring a balance between the various objectives of criminal procedure; that is the balance between the task of handling crime and maintaining strict legislation and the guaranteeing and effective protection of the procedural rights of the accused. In a few nations, the procedural rights of the accused, including the right to defense counsel, are not fully guaranteed, and are, indeed, often violated.

According to surveys by a group of researchers, the right to defense counsel at the pre-trial stage is not always guaranteed even in many European nations. According to the National Committee on the Right to Counsel, in the United States, the constitutional right to counsel for defendants who cannot afford to hire a lawyer despite facing the possibility of imprisonment is weakened as many states and localities still fail to provide competent criminal defense counsel. In very many countries, insufficient funding and/or oversight of public defender systems has led to unacceptable caseloads, supervision and training, resulting in inadequate representation.

Representation is frequently perfunctory and so deficient as not to amount to representation at all. In fact, in both Europe and America, there have been moves towards the continued development and improvement of legislation in order to provide complete legal mechanisms which will protect the accused’s right to defense counsel. Basing themselves on the Lisbon Treaty, European member states have been taken a number of steps to foster and establish a complete and coherent mechanism guaranteeing the basic procedural rights of the accused in EU as the whole.


1. Historical views of the guarantee of the right to defense counsel
 
At one stage in legal history, there was no formal definition of the right to defense counsel. However, the right of a person charged with a criminal offense to have the assistance of counsel is not a new concept. This right appeared at a very early time and is closely attached to the judgment at trial. Research has established that trials in which the defendants were allowed the assistance of counsel can be traced back through several centuries. Many scholars referred to the Leges Henrici Primi, commonly known as the laws of King Henry I, as the first written reference to the appearance of that right in England. This is a collection of early English common and statutory laws, which is believed to have been composed in the early 12th century. Translations of the book, originally in Latin, are sometimes uncertain.

However, as regards the right to counsel, all legal scholars’ works seem to refer to one passage in the book, which Donahue attempted to translate as follows: “In criminal or capital cases let no man seek consilium; rather let him forthwith deny [the charge] without having pleaded [and] without any asking for consilium, of whatever nation or state of life he may be; [then] let his defender or his lord follow up his affirmative defence or denial by the appropriate method of proof.”

As analysed by Donahue, the passage reveals that during the middle medieval time, an accused person him/herself had to plead in a criminal trial. To plead he/she must not seek help from consilium, who could be friends or kinsmen who, with knowledge of the facts of the case, could attempt to sway the opinion of the court to the benefit of the accused. This essentially meant that the accused person was not entitled to any assistance before and at the time of the plea. After having pleaded, the accused were entitled to legal assistance, which could be provided by a man learned in the law, the pleader, who would be comparable to today’s practicing lawyers.

It is clear from Donahue’s analyses that during medieval times, the accused person was indeed allowed legal assistance at some stage of the criminal procedure. This view seems to be shared by many other scholars. It is quite obvious from scholarly works on the Leges that in its time the accused person was primarily expected and supposed to stand alone to defend him/herself as regards the fact of his/her case. The right to defense counsel, if ever available, was focused on the settlement of the legal aspects of the case alone. It was, however, recorded in some cases in the 14th century that the right to defense counsel was not granted to persons accused of felony at all.

Several authors have also shown that the right to defense counsel began to appear at the time of formation of the adversarial system, which developed in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. At that time a series of treason trials in England led to calls for changes in the way the accused could defend themselves against the Crown. 

As noted above, this shows that the initial guarantee of the right to a defence related to allowing the accused to defend him/herself. However, practice judgment at that time demonstrated that the defendant’s self-defence before the court (and representing the King) was very challenging and could even give rise to an adverse effect, especially in serious criminal cases. The view that the defendant should be assisted by an attorney during trial then emerged. During the period from the 15th to the early 17th century, as evidence becoming prevalent in criminal trials, the right to defense counsel became allowed for lesser crimes and misdemeanours too. This was indicated clearly by Bulstrode Whiteloke: “for a trespass or sixpences value, a man may have a counsellor to plead for him.”

The right to defense counsel seems then to have been a reaction against the English practice of denying the assistance of an attorney in serious criminal cases and requiring defendants to appear before the court and defend themselves in their own words.

Since 1836, full assurance of the right to counsel has been granted not only in felony but also in misdemeanour trials. The right to be represented by counsel is a way of extending or improving on the right to self-defend as self-defence was unsafe and might even be forbidden before the King. Researchers believe that allowing defence counsel was actually the first step towards a trial system that would eventually come to be lawyer-dominated versus the earlier lawyer-free system. This led to the formation of a regime which guarantees the right to have counsel to defendants in common law countries which becomes a criterion of an adversarial trial.

Initial manifestations of the right to have counsel are not only the presence of defense counsel in serious criminal cases but also the granting of counsel as a favour given by the King to the indigent, the mark of a charitable policy. Swygert has shown that England has a five-century long tradition of providing free lawyers for indigent people in both criminal and civil cases. This tradition originated in 1494, when Parliament passed a law which stated that the English courts would provide free publicly paid counsel for poor persons. However, its application in reality was very limited. This is still considered as the first legal indication of the guarantee of a right to defense counsel for indigent people, although this guarantee was not recognized in each separate legal system, even when this right was recognized in most international conventions on human rights.

That said, a progressive outlook has strongly influenced the awareness of law-makers in modern times. Many scholars have recognised that the adversarial system always acknowledges that counsel have played an important role in providing fairness. Judges in England, and in other countries using an adversarial system assume that the concept of assistance by counsel involves two separate matters. The first is whether or not the accused shall have the right to have the assistance of his friends (his counsel) in making his defence against the charge for which he has been indicted, provided that this counsel be supplied at his own expense; and second, whether or not it is the duty of the state to supply counsel to the defendant, if the defendant cannot afford to obtain his own. These initial indications of the history of the guarantee of the right to defense counsel are markers leading to the current recognition and development of this right in most criminal procedure systems.

The development of the right to defense counsel in England rapidly spread to other European countries, even where the inquisitorial system exists. From the view point of criminal procedure under the English accusatory system, seventeenth century France affords a convenient starting point. Like the rest of the Continent, France had adopted the inquisitorial system of criminal procedure law, a regimen of legal techniques which derived their origin in part, at least, from Roman law which was rediscovered in the thirteenth century. However, unlike Common law, initially the right to defence counsel was not accepted, and this was even clearly stated in the statutes. 

For example, Article 162 of the Ordinance of 1539 had stipulated that: “In criminal matters the parties shall in no wise be heard by counsel or agency of any third person; but they shall answer by their own word of mouth for the crimes of which they are accused. Despite such comprehensive language, the humanity or good sense of the French judiciary had to some extent construed away the inflexibility of the prohibition, so that a certain discretion came to adhere to the courts. Some judges still interpreted the article strictly and refused counsel in all cases even if others had felt free to permit and even to assign counsel in various types of prosecution.

In the subsequent Ordinance of 1670, the right to counsel was officially considered. The criminal procedure of France had already become:

"Absolutely secret, not only in the sense that everything took place beyond the range of the public eye, but in the sense that no production of documents was made to the accused. The aid of counsel and the freedom to summon witnesses for the defence had been taken away from him one after the other".

The conference deliberating on the Ordinance of 1670 proposed to remedy this insecurity. The opinion of Guillaume de Lamoignon, First President of the Parlement de Paris, was believed to have a critical effect on the subsequent recognition of the right to have counsel. He assumed that:

"No evil which could happen in the administration of justice is comparable to that of causing the death of an innocent person, and it would be better to acquit a thousand guilty. This counsel… is not a privilege granted by the Ordinance or by the laws. It is a liberty obtained from natural law, which is older than all human laws".

Lamoignon’s speech on the right to defense counsel has reverberated down the centuries, but was unheard and unheeded in the France of Louis XIV. The Ordinance of 1670, in its final form, still prohibited the employment of counsel in capital cases. Not until 1808 did the Napoleonic Code of Criminal Procedure make it compulsory that the defendant should have a lawyer when tried in the assize court. French law also required that an attorney represent the accused during the process of pretrial investigation. Soon after that, the accused in France was granted the right to the assistance of an advocat (attorney), and if he or she cannot afford one, then one is to be appointed.

In brief, by comparison with England, countries with an inquisitorial tradition only allowed the present of counsel in criminal cases at a later time. However, both adversarial and inquisitorial system eventually adopted the view that the right to defense counsel is a fundamental human right of the accused and the State has a responsibility to assist the accused in implementing his/her legitimate rights.

In conclusion, the right to defense counsel is linked to the formation of the adversarial system, which requires a fair balance between the parties engaged in the proceedings. Crucial here is the acknowledgement that there must be an equal contest of two adversarial forces, between the accused and the prosecutor. As such, the right to defense counsel is a procedural right belonging to the accused – who is accused by the State of committing an offense. Historical studies have indicated that despite certain drawbacks, the guarantee of the right to defense counsel always attaches to the State. Where the accused is indigent or is in other difficult circumstances, he/she will be entitled to enjoy special assistance. All this is now seen as a basic foundation for any legal system. 

The right to defense counsel is currently acknowledged in Constitutions and laws of most countries. Moreover, this right has been further standardized in international conventions on human rights and such provisions are seen as standard in countries which guarantee the right to have counsel. This guarantee, in the context of international conventions on human rights means, according to Treschel, the right to have the professional assistance and services of counsel.


2.  Legal foundation of the right to defense counsel
 
Following  from  the  very  nature  of  criminal  procedure,  prosecution  by  the  State  of  the  accused  reveals  an  imbalance  in  term  of  rights  and  interests.  As such, the accused must be equipped with certain legal rights if they are to be able to protect their legitimate rights and interests.  This  issue,  in  the  broad  sense,  is  not  just  the  guarantee of the rights and interests of the accused as such but also the guarantee of the  objectiveness  and  fairness  of  the  whole  process  of  criminal  procedure.  

The guarantee of the accused’s rights in general and the guarantee of the right to defence counsel in particular must be based upon a fair balance between the parties involved in criminal procedure.  Knowledge of the criminal procedure has indicated that the right to defense counsel has been based on the theory of due process of law and on the right to a fair trial.

2.1. Due Process of law
 
In most legal systems worldwide, we can easily find the right to or the principle of a “Fair Trial” as a basic legal right of citizens. Originally, this right emerged late in the world’s history and is connected to the theory of the Due Process of Law. At the time of its appearance, this concept of the due process of law is simply understood as a progressive ideology to protect human rights from the severe provisions of the laws. However, the current basic contents of the “due process of law” have been acknowledged and developed not only by scholars but in legislative conceptions in many countries.

A primary manifestation of the due process of law has been found in the Law of the Twelve Tables.

This Law has been considered as the earliest statute law of the Roman Republic, enacted in 455 BC. The founding of this Law was the result of a fight for fairness of rights initiated by a number of plebeians complaining of the unfairness of the treatment of the nobility in the Roman Public. The contents of the Law were specified in 12 Tables, which mainly covered the guarantee of legitimate rights and interests to all citizens. The right to have all parties present at a hearing was emphasized in Table 2.1; the principle of equality among citizens in Table 9.1; and the prohibition of any acts of bribery of judicial agencies was provided for in Table 9. In terms of criminal cases, the Law acknowledged the equality of the adverse parties in the procedural process.

 In order to guarantee the legitimate rights and interests of the accused, Table 1 of the Law specified: “Where a person is accused of any offense, not only he/she but also the accusing person must be present at the court trial”. In addition, Table 9 provided punishments for acts violating legal proceedings and relating to the persons participating in the judgment of the case. In particular, the penalty shall be death for a judge or arbiter legally appointed who has been found guilty of receiving a bribe for giving an acquittal in Table 9.4.

It is likely that the above mentioned Law could be considered as the first indication of the concept of the due process of law. Even though the provisions of the Law were not complete or ideal and they have rarely been mentioned, their ideas have been absorbed and developed in modern legislation that has outlined progressively broader conceptions of the guarantee of citizens’ rights under the law in general and the rights of the accused in particular. 

At this time, the right to a defense was not mentioned. However, the arrival of the concept of the due process of law was the foundation for subsequent developments in the rights of the accused, among which is the right to a defense. A similar indication related to the due process of law has been also found in continental European countries.

The French Declaration of Human and Civil Rights in 1789 and the Napoleonic Code in 1808 acknowledged that a defendant has enjoys a presumption of innocence and is required to have a representative to protect him/her before the court. The spirit of these provisions spread and affected the laws of many other civil law countries in Europe.  

Similarly, in common law systems, the concept of due process also has its roots in early English law. King John in 1215 conceded in the Magna Carta as follows:

 “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."

Magna Carta itself immediately became part of the "law of the land". However, it did no more than require the monarchy to obey the law of the land. In the year of 1354, in the reign of Edward III, the phrase due process of law first appeared in a statutory rendition of Magna Carta. These words were used to explain the protection set forth in Magna Carta, as follows:

 "No man of what state or condition he is, shall be put out of his lands or tenements nor taken, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without he be brought to answer by due process of law."

In 1608, the English jurist Edward Coke wrote a treatise in which he discussed the meaning of Magna Carta. Coke explained the words ‘per legem terrae’ as meaning ‘Without being brought in to answer but by due process of the common law.’Beside that, Coke set down a series of common law rights in his work (four volume Institutes of the Law of England) that protect the freeman’s life and liberty, among them due process of law. Throughout the many centuries of English legal history, there have been many laws and treatises which asserted that various different requirements were part of "due process" or part of the "law of the land", but usually that was merely because of what the actual existing law happened to be, rather than because of any intrinsic requirement.

Following Edward Coke, an American scholar, Herbert Baker, has further refined the concept of the due process of law by recognizing its purposes during the proof of crimes. Herbert Packer considered that the dominant models of criminal justice might be evaluated within the frameworks of two models: the Crime Control model and the Due Process model.

The Crime Control model is based on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is the essential function of the criminal process.

This is designed to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens by stressing efficient apprehension and punishment of criminals. Thus, the police play an important role in finding someone guilty and the later stages in the criminal process should be reduced as much as possible. So the main tools of this model are the administrative hearing to establish the facts and the opportunity to plead guilty.
 
On the other hand, the Due Process model is grounded on the idea of fairness according to which everyone should be placed in the same position in the criminal process.  It is designed to protect the rights of the accused by presenting formidable impediments to getting them past each step in the legal process.

Thus, a person may be found guilty only if the facts are clearly proved according to the law by a competent tribunal. This view of Packer expresses the view of the Fourteenth Amendment of US Constitution on Due Process: “no one shall be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law.”

It can be said that these views mark a major step in developing the concept of due process. Originally, Due Process results from following appropriate procedures and its nature is seen as fundamental to the protection of human rights. The fairness of the legal process has a particular significant in a criminal case and the influence of the idea of due process in criminal cases is obvious. It explains the requirement of there being a fair balance between the parties when resolving the case. This involves protecting the rights of the accused, including the right to defense counsel.

The aforementioned opinions of the common law have shown that the due process of law is the origin of the guarantee of the accused’s rights. This guarantee is also in play in an adversarial trial where the initiative of the counsel is respected.

The adversarial trial is not just a typical characteristic of the nation’s following the adversarial model but also an orientation in those European law systems following the inquisitorial model.

2.2. Principle of the Right to Fair trial
 
From the foregoing analyses, we can see that the basic content of the concept of due process of law is fairness. Fairness is expressed in two ways: (1) all procedures must be conducted in a fair manner, and (2) the parties involved in the procedural process must be fairly treated. On the side of the accused, fairness requires that the competent entities, particularly the court make their awards responsibly. And the principle of the right to a fair trial is considered as a tool protecting the rights and interests of each individual against State arbitrariness and autocracy.

From a historical viewpoint, the right to a fair trial is connected to the concept of due process of law and can be traced back to Magna Carta (1215). In its theoretical aspects, the principle of the right to a fair trial is recognized in different ways. 

As a matter of form, Stefan Trechsel has written that the guarantee of a fair trial is only a procedure, designed to secure ‘procedural justice’ rather than ‘result-orientated justice’, i.e. a decision or judgment based on the true facts and the proper application of the law only. 

In the same spirit, law-makers in England have always assumed that the right to a fair trial comprises a number of elements to be considered under the following headings: independent and impartial tribunal, fair hearing, public hearing, hearing within a reasonable time and reasoned judgment. In terms of the contents, the right to a fair trial should be understood as protecting the search for truth.

In the most general sense, to guarantee the right to a fair trial in practice, the agencies involved must be obliged to be independent and impartial. If either of these factors is lacking, there can be no fairness. Independence means that the court and the judge do not depend on any individual or organization of the State authorities.

In addition, fairness is deemed to involve the thorough consideration of the circumstances as well as the provisions of all relevant laws. Impartiality requires that the judge not be biased in favour of either party.

Discussing the right to a fair trial, two aspects are recognized: the first is the principle of equality of arms and the second is the right to an adversarial proceeding.

The principle of equality of arms implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent. Accordingly, the court just gives its conclusion after both the prosecution and the defense side are given the opportunity to comment on the observations filed and evidence adduced by the other party.

This mean that no decision, which is not entirely and unconditionally in favour of an individual, may be taken unless the person concerned was previously given an opportunity to state his or her position on the issue. Of course, the right also implies that the court has an obligation to take the submissions of the defence into account, which is an obvious precondition for the effectiveness of an adversarial proceeding. This observation shows that, as the term ‘equality of arms’ indicates, this criterion is a comparative one. A comparison of the actual treatment of the opposing parties must be undertaken in order to ascertain whether an applicant has been disadvantaged. 

The notion of ‘adversarial proceeding’ presupposes equal adversaries and in a sense is more specific.

In any case, the most fundamental aspect of ‘fairness’ in proceedings is the right to be heard.

In criminal cases, equality of arms requires the defence to be on an equal footing with the prosecution. All the written evidence that the prosecution submits to the court must be communicated to defense counsel so that it can present its counter-arguments.

The right to a fair trial is one of the human rights best protected under international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) established some general principles on the right of persons facing criminal charges. These are contained in three key Articles: Article 9 deal with protection against arbitrary arrest; Article 10 expresses the right to be tried in public and in full equality by an independent and impartial tribunal; Article 11 provides some more detailed provisions, such as the presumption of innocence and the right of the accused to have ‘all the guarantees necessary for his defence’. 

Compliance with the general principles set out in UDHR, the right to a fair trial is reflected in the international legal instruments on human rights. Provisions protecting rights of fair trial can also be found in Articles 14, 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Articles 5, 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); Articles 3, 8, 9 and 10 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR); Articles 2, 7 and 26 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (AfCHPR).

In practice, the concept of the right to a fair trial is interpreted in more detail and more specifically by the agencies implementing the Treaties. For instance, according to the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s interpretation, the right to a fair trial is broader than the sum of the individual fair trial guarantees and depends on the entire conduct of the trial.

Similar sentiments have been expressed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In another sense, the right to a fair trial is seen as equivalent to the equality of arms. According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), “equality of arms, which must be observed throughout the trial process, mean that both parties are treated in a manner ensuring that they have a procedurally equal position during the course of the trial, and are in an equal position to make their case.”

In this case, the Court found that the right to a fair trial was violated where one side was denied access to relevant documents in the case file.

On the drafting side, the international instruments on the protection of individual rights in criminal trial are very similar. Among the general fair trial protections are:
 
      1. the right to be heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal;

      2. the right to a public hearing;

      3. the right to be heard within a reasonable time;

      4. the right to counsel;

      5. the right to interpretation. 



   In criminal proceedings the following also apply in addition to the general guarantees already mention: 
 
    1.  the right to be notified of the charge against one in a timely manner;
    2.  the right to adequate time and means for the preparation of one’s defence;
    3.  the right of an accused to defend him/her self in person or to be assisted by a counsel of his/ her choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his/her counsel;  

    4. the right to call witnesses;
    5. the right not to incriminate oneself; 
    6. the right to appeal

   2.3. Purpose of the right to defense counsel
 
   Why do accused persons need to defense counsel to protect their rights and interests? And why does the State have the responsibility of guaranteeing this right of theirs? The historical summary given above has demonstrated that the formation and development of the right to defense counsel expresses the demand for the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of people facing the power of the State. 

A fair judgment is called for by the parties to a criminal case. This can only be the end result of a fair procedure, at which the rights of the accused must be respected and guaranteed. This guarantee has the following aspects:

     First, the right to defense counsel is aimed at giving the accused the opportunity of seeing his or her legitimate rights and interests protected during the process of the criminal procedure. Counsel acts as an advisor to the accused, to assist in defending against the accusations of criminal procedure specialists such as investigators, prosecutors and judges and all this reflects a subjective requirement of the principle of “equality of arms”.

   In addition, the counsel will be the person giving the accused the necessary skills, including knowledge of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed in criminal procedure laws (including both national laws and international conventions). 

   The aim is to create an attachment between the right to have counsel and the nature of the procedural progress.The right to defense counsel will guarantee that the accused can take a more active role in criminal procedure instead of an inherently negative position.

   Commenting on the role of the accused, the assistance of counsel is the key which opens the door to all the rights and possibilities of defence in the substantive sense of the term. It is clear that the law – substantive as well as procedural - is a rather complicated matter, which is often unintelligible to the layperson.

   The second aspect of the right to defense counsel is to guarantee general humanitarian aims. As before, the accused will have to confront the accusations of competent agencies during the procedural process. A series of such decisions involving arrest, detention, interrogation, etc may lead to unemployment and separation from one’s family and general alienation from society. These consequences may well result in psychological problems for the accused. It can be seen that law-makers have also recognized the possibility of such consequences and the potential unfairness if the accused are not assisted by the counsel.

    3. Guarantee of the right to defense counsel in international legal documents

   The right to defense counsel is recognized and guaranteed in most international conventions on human rights. In this section, the author will present aspects of the guarantee by analyzing the provisions of relevant international conventions on human rights.

   International legal documents regarding the right to defense counsel are all based on the founding principle of the right to a fair trial. They establish international standards on the right to defense counsel in Treaties (Conventions) which are then legally binding on their member countries. 

   On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the UDHR. Article 11(1) of this Declaration stated:

    Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence”. 

   Even the foregoing statement does not directly mention the right to defense counsel but subsequent interpretation of Article 11 has shown that the right to defense counsel is a key element of the right to a fair trial as mentioned in Article 10 of the Declaration: “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him”. 

   Based upon the spirit of the Declaration, the right to defense counsel has been recognized in international legal instruments in two contexts: (1) the global context (the United Nations itself) and (2) the regional context.

   In the global context, the right to defense counsel is recognized in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as follows:

   Everyone charged with an offence shall have the right:

    1. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
    2. to defend in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing;  
        3.If he does not have legal assistance, legal assistance will be provided to him in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it. 

   In addition, the right to defense counsel was also be guaranteed by the other relevant international instruments, such as the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, the Rome Status of the International Criminal Court etc. Besides, the organizers of the United Nations play significant role in explaining and guiding the application of provisions of the ICCPR on the right to defense counsel.

   In many regional instruments, covering Europe, America and Africa, the right to defense counsel is now recognized. Europe can be deemed to be the leading region in developing regimes protecting human rights. 

   The relevant instrument in Europe is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Similar to the regulations in the ICCPR, the right to defense counsel is guaranteed in Article 6 of the ECHR. According to this, the accused shall have the right:
            
1. to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his defence;
2. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.
The EU accepts the ECHR as the common basis for the protection of the rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, and the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) are seen as the basis for harmonising the criminal justice systems of the Member States and for strengthening their mutual trust. The roadmap has also provided new directions for reaffirming and expanding the procedural rights of the accused person, including the right to legal counsel. Currently, the Treaty of Lisbon effective on 1 December 2009 has unified many issues relating to EU legislation and has suggested a path to joining the European Convention on Human Rights of the European Union.

If this happened, it would mean that the EU and other organizations of the EU will be responsible to the ECtHR in respect of matters governed by the ECHR.

According to European scholars now, the guarantee of the right to an effective defense must be understood at 3 levels: first, the right to defense counsel must ensure that the accused shall be supported in a timely and full manner with all conditions needed to implement his rights being satisfied; second, the right to defense counsel must be recognized in the system of statutory documents and must be laid out in practice; third, improvement of the knowledge and professionalism of defense counsel must be provided for. All this derives from acknowledging that the right to an effective defense stems from respecting human rights and placing the accused in the central position in a criminal case.

In America and Africa, the right to defense counsel has been recognized in the American Convention on Human Rights and the Convention on Human Rights and People’s Rights respectively. 

In America, the foundational principles of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man have been re-confirmed in the American Convention on Human Rights which was adopted in 1969. 

The right to defense counsel is acknowledged in Article 8 of tise Convention. Accordingly, a person who is charged with an offence shall have the following rights:
                       

1.    the right to have adequate time and means for the preparation of his defence;

2.    the right to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel;

3.    the right of the defence to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may throw light on the facts. 

    
This Convention determines the human rights which member nations have to abide by and to guarantee, and concurrently established the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 

The Convention is now binding upon 24 out of the 35 member nations of the Organization of American States (OAS). The United States is not a member of this Convention even though it signed in 1977.

The foundational instrument on human rights in Africa is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – AfCHPR (hereinafter referred to as the African Charter) passed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 27 June 1981, effective on 21 October 1981. 

The right to defense counsel is acknowledged in Article 7 of the Charter as follows: “Every individual shall have the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice…” In comparison with the previous Conventions on human right, the guarantee of the right to defense counsel in the African Charter has a narrower extent. An African Court of Human Rights was set up after the Protocol supplementing the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (itself passed in 1998) took effect in 2004.


Bibliography:

Guarantee of the accused person's right to defense counsel. A comparative study of criminal procedure law. Luong Thi, My Quynh

Felix Rackow, The right to counsel: English and America Precedent, The William and Mary Quaterly, Third Series, Vol.11, No.1, (1954).

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. 4, 1769

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